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Both the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and the contrasting
"greater power includes the lesser" argument have suffered fierce ac-
ademic criticism,1 yet each survives. Justices of the Supreme Court
continue to rely explicitly or implicitly on one or the other doctrine,2
bringing a new wave of academic criticism.3
In this essay, I will suggest that the hoary threat/offer distinction
helps explain and justify the continued survival of the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine, but only a narrow version of that doctrine.
At the same time, the threat/offer distinction also helps explain and
justify the continued survival of a narrow version of the "greater in-
cludes the lesser" argument. My claim depends on a careful analysis
of what constitutes a "threat" and an "offer," an analysis that looks
to philosophical as well as legal sources.
Part I gives a simple example of the threat/offer distinction and
briefly presents my thesis. In Part II, I step back to define the con-
tours of the analysis. Only a small number of constitutional cases, I
conclude, directly raise the issue of "unconstitutional conditions"
(hereafter "UC") or "the greater power includes the lesser" (hereaf-
ter "GIL"). Part III defines the threat/offer distinction and suggests
why, in its pure form, it is morally and constitutionally significant.
Part IV attempts to apply the analysis to the more complicated, im-
pure world of government benefit programs.
PART I
AN EXAMPLE, AND A PRECIS OF THE THESIS
I begin with an example, adapted from Professor Laurence Tribe.4
I then set out the basic thesis of this essay. More detailed supporting
1. For some recent examples, see Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of Rights, 33
UCLA L. REV. 977 (1986); Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative
Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984).
2. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987);
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); Federal Communi-
cation Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 408 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). See also City
of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138, 2159 (1988) (White, J.,
dissenting).
3. Apart from this volume of essays, see Seidman, Reflections on Context and
the Constitution, 73 MINN. L. REV. 73, 75-78 (1988); Sullivan, Unconstitutional Condi-
tions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989) (severely criticizing the current unconstitutional
conditions approaches, but supporting a new and more expansive approach); Epstein, The
Supreme Court 1987 Term-Foreward: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and
the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1988) (supporting the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine only in a radically conservative form). Recent commentary on the
Nollan case also discusses its "unconstitutional conditions"/"greater includes the lesser"
themes. See, e.g., the collection of articles in The Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1581 (1988); Note, Municipal Developments Exactions, the Rational Nexus
Test, and the Federal Constitution, 102 HARV. L. REV. 992 (1989).
4. See Tribe, Private Choices and Public Funding: Abortion Revisited, in J.
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arguments will be found in the body of the essay.
Suppose the federal government selects 100 citizens at random for
an experiment: it offers the 100 citizens $200 each, in the form of a
tax rebate, if they will not speak for two days. The purpose of the
experiment is to discover some of the effects of people remaining si-
lent for an extended period of time. The information that is thus
disclosed might help the government understand how hostages and
prisoners of war are affected by isolation.
Now consider a second version of the experiment. Again, the gov-
ernment selects 100 citizens at random, and asks them not to speak
for two days. But this time, if the citizens choose speech over silence,
the government will increase their taxes by $200.'
The offer (the first version) seems clearly constitutional, while the
threat (the second version) is clearly unconstitutional. Moreover, the
same conclusions would be warranted if the offer and threat applied
to government benefits such as welfare. That is, it is permissible for
the government to offer welfare recipients an increase of $200 in
their benefits if they remain silent, but it is not permissible to
threaten to decrease their benefits by $200 if they choose to speak.
So the threat/offer distinction applies both to direct regulations and
burdens (such as taxes) and to withdrawals of government benefits
(such as welfare).
As I will later argue in more detail, the threat is more trouble-
some than the offer because it is presumptively unfair for govern-
ment to make citizens worse off, even to serve a legitimate interest,
when citizens have neither contributed to the problem they have
been "drafted" to correct nor received a reciprocal benefit. So
threats should be subject to a higher degree of judicial scrutiny than
offers. And this should be so whether the threat/offer is attached to
a "gratuitous" government benefit or to an affirmative government
burden.
For these purposes, a "threat" is a government proposal to make
the citizen worse off than she would otherwise be if she refuses to
accept an objectionable condition, while an "offer" is a proposal to
make her better off than she would otherwise be if she accepts the
condition. More precisely, where she would "otherwise be" means
CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
1979-1980: AN EDITED TRANSCRIPT OF THE SECOND ANNUAL SUPREME COURT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SYMPOSIUM 256 (1981).
5. If this example seems unrealistic, imagine instead that the government offers
a $50 tax rebate if you give blood (offer), or instead increases your taxes by $50 if you
do not give blood (threat).
the level of benefits or burdens that the government would confer
upon her if it were not permitted to attach to its proposal the condi-
tion to which she objects. This hypothetical descriptive test is not a
test of what the recipient has historically received, nor a test of what
she expects to receive, but a test of what she "otherwise" would re-
ceive (in the sense just defined).
Although this test helps explain our intuitions about the "pure"
threat and offer in the examples just given, it needs modification as
applied to the "impure" world of complex government benefit pro-
grams. For example, a work requirement that served as an eligibility
condition for government welfare benefits would be considered a
pure threat under the unmodified test, unless the government consid-
ered the condition so critical that government would drop the wel-
fare program entirely rather than drop the condition. Here, the un-
modified test does not seem to be a sensible criterion of which
conditions are more troublesome and which conditions are less so.
I tentatively conclude that when the condition is plausibly related
to the legitimate purposes of the government program, then the im-
pure threat deserves less scrutiny than a pure threat would deserve.
Two rationales support this conclusion. First, the same factors that
militate in favor of higher scrutiny of pure threats militate in favor
of lower scrutiny of impure ones: a government benefit program may
offer reciprocal benefits, and its conditions may reflect real costs that
the recipient imposes. Second, in the pure context, the nature of the
government benefit is essentially irrelevant to its value as either a
carrot or stick to induce desired conduct. But in the impure context,
only a particular type of carrot or stick will serve the government's
purposes; the government is not simply using its largesse to induce
compliance.
Thus, the threat/offer distinction helps explain why pure threats
to reduce otherwise available levels of government largesse based on
a condition affecting a constitutional right are just as troublesome as
direct burdens or taxes. This is the narrow sense in which the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine is valid. At the same time, when a
benefit condition is plausibly related to the program's purposes, the
"impure" threat might be no more troublesome than an offer. In this
narrow sense, the greater power includes the lesser.
PART II
WHEN Do UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND "GREATER
INCLUDES THE LESSER" ARGUMENTS REALLY MATTER?
The modern consensus about GIL and UC arguments is a moder-
ate one: (1) the "greater" power to eliminate some government
"benefit" does not always include the "lesser" power to impose a
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condition that affects a constitutional right; (2) but at the same time,
not every condition on government largesse that would be unconsti-
tutional if imposed by "direct" regulation, or if attached to a "right"
rather than a "privilege," is an unconstitutional condition.6
The "greater" does not include the "lesser" for the simple reason
that the "lesser" is "greater" in one significant respect - it more
greatly affects exercise of a constitutional right.' For example, the
government possesses the "greater" power to eliminate a welfare
program. But it hardly follows that government could grant citizens
welfare on the condition that they not publicly criticize public offi-
cials. This is a "lesser" power only in the sense that citizens have not
been completely deprived of welfare. But it is a "greater" power be-
cause, unlike a complete elimination of welfare, it penalizes and may
deter exercise of a constitutional right.8
On the other hand, just because the government cannot impose a
condition "directly," it does not follow that the condition is always
unconstitutional when attached to a government benefit. Consider
the federal Hatch Act: Although the government may iot forbid all
citizens from campaigning, a "direct" infringement of political
speech, it may forbid government employees from campaigning be-
cause of the unique dangers of corruption. 9
If neither the UC argument nor the GIL argument is absolute,
when, if ever, do they properly apply? Seth Kreimer has ably ex-
plored this question.10 I largely agree with his analysis and his con-
clusion that many supposed examples of the UC or GIL problem are
better explained on other doctrinal grounds. In this section, I will
briefly explain my own views.
One preliminary point: I will focus upon the UC/GIL problem in
connection with the individual liberty provisions of the Constitution,
such as the rights of free speech, of free exercise of religion, and of
6. For an especially clear statement of this moderate view, see Westen, Rueful
Rhetoric, supra note 1.
7. See Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions, supra note 1, at 1310-11; Westen, Rue-
ful Rhetoric, supra note 1, at 1012.
8. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (although tax exemption is a
gratuitous benefit, the state violates the first amendment when it grants that benefit on
condition that recipients affirm their loyalty to the state government).
9. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548 (1973).
10. Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1326-51 & 1353 n.221; Kreimer, Government
"Largesse" and Constitutional Rights: Some Paths Through and Around The Swamp,
26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 229 (1989).
privacy." By contrast, structural provisions that allocate power be-
tween the branches of government or between the federal and state
governments might not raise the UC or GIL problem at all, or might
not raise it in the same way."2
A. The Unconstitutional Conditions Argument
Even if a benefit is constitutionally a "gratuity,"' 3 conditions on
its grant might be subject to constitutional restraint. How can this
be?
The answer has several parts. Both equality principles and several
sorts of nonequality principles constrain the government from condi-
tioning "gratuitous" benefits.' 4 But most of these principles do not
invoke, or do not need to invoke, UC or GIL arguments. Put another
way, most of these principles apply in virtually the same manner to
"gratuitous" and "nongratuitous" benefits.
11. Similarly, Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the Religion Clauses, 1981 Sup.
CT. REv. 193, 198-99, confines his inquiry to government burdens and inducements that
affect constitutional freedoms or choices. Accord Westen, Rueful Rhetoric, supra note 1,
at 983 & n.7; Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1426. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending
and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1115 (1987), is concerned with "coercive"
rather than "classifying" conditions, since the latter merely "define[ ] eligibility in terms
: * . outside of the control of the potential recipients." But cf. id. at 1157-58, apparently
interpreting "classifying" conditions more broadly as any absolute eligibility conditions,
or any conditions that do not significantly affect conduct.
12. See Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1353-54 n.221. Although conditional federal
grants to states might be analogous, they differ at least insofar as states do not assert
individual liberty rights against the federal government. See generally Rosenthal, supra
note 11.
13. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970).
14. In the broadest sense, a benefit is "gratuitous" if the government could consti-
tutionally eliminate it. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1422. In that sense, however, virtu-
ally all things that people value in this world are "gratuitous." The government "could"
eliminate all public spaces for speaking. It probably "could" forbid a wide variety of
occupations and activities. And it probably "could" eliminate all private property pro-
spectively. Indeed, probably the only "benefits" that the government is required to "con-
fer" or "permit" are: affirmative private exercises of liberty, such as free speech; positive
government systems of protection, such as due process guarantees within the criminal
justice system; and negative governmental duties not to affirmatively act in certain ways,
such as fourth and eighth amendment prohibitions.
Defining "gratuitous" benefits this broadly ignores possibly relevant distinctions be-
tween negative and positive duties, or benefits and burdens. It also ignores other impor-
tant factors, such as the timing of the elimination of the "benefit," the individual's reli-
ance and expectations, and the government's reasons for eliminating or preserving some
state of affairs.
In this essay, I am discussing "gratuitous" benefits in a narrower sense, essentially as
"New Property" benefits or government largesse rather than as traditional property in-
terests or as independent liberty interests. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J.
733 (1964); Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 3 (1983). Perhaps exemptions from taxation or regulation should also be
considered "gratuities." See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1424 (defining such exemptions,
as well as government largesse, as the "[t]wo basic sorts of government gratuities"). But
this characterization question is not important to my thesis.
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1. Equality Principles
Equality principles are the most obvious example of a constitu-
tional constraint in which the status of the government benefit as a
"gratuity" seems largely irrelevant.15 Even if a government is dis-
tributing a "gratuitous" benefit, such as a welfare benefit or a tax
rebate, it must distribute the benefit "equally" in the relevant sense;
it cannot distribute the benefit only to whites, or only to men, or only
to an irrationally chosen subgroup. And an equalization in either di-
rection (extension of the benefit to, or retraction from, both groups)
comports with equality principles.1 6 Equality or "neutrality" princi-
ples may derive from constitutional provisions other than equal pro-
tection,'17 but whatever their source, they apply regardless of whether
the claimed inequality attaches to a "gratuitous" benefit or a
"right."
I am therefore quite surprised that Kathleen Sullivan's recent,
thoughtful analysis of unconstitutional conditions doctrine relies so
heavily on equality principles.' 8 There is no special need to invoke
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine when equality, neutrality,
and antisubordination principles are adequate to the task.
15. See Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U.L. REV. 387, 427, 446-
49 (1985); Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1353 n.221.
16. Simons, Equality, supra note 15, at 427-34. Antisubordination principles, too,
might share this general characteristic. That is, they might only require that the "bene-
fit" be distributed so as not to subordinate a group; any distribution that so conforms is
permissible. See Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion" A New Model, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 447, 462 (1989). For example, providing a bonus only to military veterans might
further the subordination of women; but providing a bonus either to all citizens or to
none or (perhaps) only to women veterans might be a "nonsubordinating" distribution.
See also Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1497-99 (discussing the similar concept of "prevent-
ing constitutional caste").
17. The first amendment's prohibition on policies that discriminate based on the
"content" of speech is but one example. See generally Simons, Equality, supra note 15,
at 423, 467-69.
18. Under the rubric of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, Sullivan suggests
three triggers for strict scrutiny. The second and third essentially involve inequality in
the distribution of government benefits:
Second, an unconstitutional condition can skew the distribution of constitu-
tional rights among rightholders because it necessarily discriminates facially
between those who do and those who do not comply with the condition. If gov-
ernment has an obligation of evenhandedness or neutrality with regard to a
right, this sort of redistribution is inappropriate. Third, to the extent that a
condition discriminates de facto between those who do and do not depend on a
government benefit, it can create an undesirable caste hierarchy in the enjoy-
ment of constitutional rights.
Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1490 (emphasis original); see id. at 1496-99.
2. Nonequality Principles
Here, the "unconstitutional condition" doctrine has the following
very abstract form. Government is not constitutionally required to
distribute or confer the "benefit," but if it does, it must distribute or
confer "in accordance with the nonequality principle." At least three
categories of "nonequality principles" exist: impermissible deterrent
effect, impermissible motive, and a residual category, inconsistent
with the constitutional value. I discuss each category in turn.
a. Impermissible Deterrent Effect on a Right
Suppose the government offers citizens $20,000 not to attend
church or synagogue, in order to determine the strength of citizens'
religious beliefs. The result might be a significant decrease in actual
religious practice. This policy would be unconstitutional, even though
it involves a "gratuitous" benefit, because it has the substantial and
unjustifiable effect of deterring exercise of a constitutional right.19
Or suppose the government offered welfare recipients an enormous
benefit increase if, as in my original hypothetical, they remained si-
lent for two days. The policy would be highly troublesome, in part
because the poverty of the offerees might cause a high proportion of
them to give up their rights.20
This "impermissible deterrent effect" argument is often empiri-
cally questionable, however. Often most recipients or offerees would
choose simply to forego the benefit, rather than forego the constitu-
tional right. Moreover, a condition might be unconstitutional even if
it does not appreciably deter constitutionally protected behavior. "A
one dollar fine for choosing to be critical of the government ...
would be as clearly suspect as a one thousand dollar fine."2 By the
same token, even a one dollar tax rebate - a "gratuitous benefit" -
for those who do not criticize the government would be
unconstitutional.
b. Impermissible Government Motive
Suppose the government withdraws "gratuitous" benefits from a
citizen because of hostility to her speech publicly criticizing the gov-
ernment. The withdrawal is plainly unconstitutional. And it illus-
trates that the prohibition on impermissibly motivated government
19. Also, government's asserted reason for this policy might be illegitimate. See
text infra at notes 22-23.
20. It would also be troublesome because it seems to exploit their economic vul-
nerability. For sources discussing the ways in which offers might exploit the weak, see
infra note 66.
21. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1457 n.18 (2d ed. 1988). See
also Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1319-20.
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conduct applies equally to "gratuitous" and "nongratuitous"
benefits.22
Just what counts as "hostility" to, or an "intention to penalize,"
exercise of a constitutional right is a very difficult question. Some-
times, I suspect, the Court uses such expressions to describe not an
actual improper purpose or mental state but government action that
is inconsistent with the relevant constitutional values.23 I now turn to
that category.
c. Inconsistent with the Relevant Constitutional Values
This is my catch-all category for impermissible conditions on
"gratuitous" government benefits that fit none of the other catego-
ries. In this category, courts often speak of the unfairness of putting
the recipient to the choice, or of her paying an unwarranted price or
penalty. And it is this category that most acutely raises the UC/GIL
problem.24
22. This example could also reflect an equality/neutrality principle, but it need
not. For imagine that government withdraws benefits from anyone who speaks in public,
regardless of what she says. To be sure, even this last example presents an "equality"
problem in a sense, because the government is treating "speech" worse than "non-
speech." Still, the main problem is not that government has created inequality, but that
government is intentionally suppressing speech for no legitimate reason. See Simons,
Equality, supra note 15, at 462-67.
Kreimer objects to the use of motive tests in allocative sanction cases. Kreimer, supra
note 1, at 1333-40. Although I do not fully share that objection, I do agree that motive
tests are not sufficient to explain the unfairness of some allocative sanctions. Id. at 1338-
40.
23. For example, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Supreme
Court held that the purpose to deter the influx of poor families who traveled to the state
in order to get welfare assistance was impermissible, because it was simply a purpose to
chill the exercise of a constitutional right. But of course the state never admitted to a
purpose to chill the exercise of the right to travel as such. Rather, the state wanted to
delay benefit payments to those travelers who had migrated with the purpose of getting
higher benefits. Consider this variation on the facts: Suppose the state had deliberately
excluded those who traveled to the state in order to commit a crime therein; the state's
purpose, in a loose sense, is to deter the right to travel, but in a strict sense, it is to
prevent crime. Presumably its more general purpose is to prevent crime on the part of
travelers and residents alike.
Shapiro might be rightly decided, but the Court should have reasoned differently, as
follows: (1) Persons have a right to travel for the purpose of obtaining welfare benefits -
even if they might not have any right to travel for the purpose of committing a crime;
and (2) the state's interest in excluding persons from seeking higher welfare benefits is
inconsistent with that constitutional right.
24. Sullivan's test - strictly scrutinizing "any government benefit condition
whose primary purpose or effect is to pressure recipients to alter a choice about exercise
of a preferred constitutional liberty in a direction favored by government," Sullivan,
supra note 3, at 1499-1500 - appears to ignore this category. For she seems to contem-
plate only those "effects" that deter exercise of a right. Id. at 1500-03. Similarly, Ep-
For example, the Court's reasoning in the classic UC case of Sher-
bert v. Verner does not essentially rely on any of the other catego-
ries.2r To be sure, the Court does find that the exemption of Sunday
Sabbatarians is discriminatory and compounds the unconstitutional-
ity of the treatment of Mrs. Sherbert.26 But this inequality argument
does not seem essential to the Court's holding. I believe the Court
would have reached the same result if both Saturday and Sunday
Sabbatarians had been disqualified from receiving benefits.
Nor is Sherbert a clear case of "impermissible deterrent effect,"
notwithstanding some language to this effect in the Court's opin-
ion. 27 Suppose the Court were convinced that the statute did not ac-
tually deter the exercise of the constitutional right to worship on the
day of one's choice: all persons in Mrs. Sherbert's position would
choose to give up unemployment benefits rather than give up the
right to worship on Saturday. Again, I believe the Court would nev-
ertheless have invalidated the statute. Nor is Sherbert a clear case of
"impermissible motive": the rule might have been adopted and ap-
plied for permissible administrative reasons.28
Thus, if Sherbert is correctly decided, it must be because the gov-
ernment is not permitted to put Mrs. Sherbert to this choice, to "pe-
nalize" her or make her pay a "price" for exercising a constitutional
right. The most difficult question, I think, is the content of this cate-
gory. What is the significance of the "gratuitousness" of the benefit,
or its status as a "privilege" rather than a "right"? When is the
government "withdrawing" a "benefit" rather than "threatening" a
"penalty"? And what methodology should be used here?
One general approach is balancing. Peter Westen29 and Albert
stein's analysis generally assumes that government conditions on constitutional rights sig-
nificantly deter exercise of the rights. Epstein, supra note 3, passim.
25. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Mrs. Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist, was dismissed
from her job because she refused to work on Saturday. Working on Saturday contra-
vened her religion. The state board denied her unemployment benefits, reasoning that a
job was "available" to her within the meaning of the unemployment statute. The Su-
preme Court held that the denial of unemployment benefits violated her right to the free
exercise of religion.
Note that Sherbert does not involve an "explicit" unconstitutional condition, but a
facially "neutral" condition ("Seek work every day of the week (except Sunday) if you
want unemployment benefits."). Still, the condition implicitly divides recipients into two
subclasses: Those who fail to seek work for religious reasons, and those who fail to seek
work for all other reasons. The first subclass is subject to an "unconstitutional condition."
26. Id. at 406.
27. Id. at 404, 410.
28. Although the Court believed that that reason had weak factual support and
was insufficiently compelling, the Court did not suggest that the reason could not actu-
ally have motivated the government. Id. at 406-09.
29. Westen, Rueful Rhetoric, supra note 1, at 988 (suggesting no special signifi-
cance to a provision's status as an "unconstitutional condition on a gratuity"). For an
earlier statement of this view, see French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50
GEo. L.J. 234, 246-48 (1961).
[VOL. 26: 289, 19891 Offers, Threats
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Rosenthal30 have endorsed this approach; Seth Kreimer31 and Rich-
ard Epstein3 2 have strongly criticized it. I largely agree with the crit-
icisms, but I will not repeat them here.
Another approach, and the one that I will pursue, is to examine
"baselines." To put the question crudely, has the government "penal-
ized" the recipient by lowering her from some relevant baseline, or
has it merely "withdrawn" an offer to improve her status compared
to that baseline? In exploring this issue, I will defend the view that
general baselines exist, which apply to many or most unconstitu-
tional conditions cases and which do not ordinarily vary according to
the constitutional interest at stake.33 I think "offers" differ from
"threats" whether the affected constitutional right is free speech, or
freedom from unreasonable searches, or a substantive due process
right of privacy or bodily integrity. Suppose, for example, the gov-
ernment offers money or a benefit increase if you remain silent for
two days, or if you give blood, or if you choose to take your child to
term instead of having an abortion, or if you agree to an experiment
that would otherwise amount to an invasion of privacy or fourth
amendment rights. In each of these cases, I will argue, a threatened
reduction in government benefits for not giving up the relevant rights
would be more problematic.
B. The "Greater Includes the Lesser" Argument
The above arguments might tempt one to accept without qualifica-
tion the unconstitutional conditions argument: if the government
could not impose the condition "directly," it should not be permitted
to impose the same condition "indirectly," via a government grant.
In Sherbert, the argument would be as follows: Since the govern-
ment could not directly require Mrs. Sherbert to seek and accept
Saturday work, or could not directly fine her for not working on Sat-
urday, despite her religious beliefs, it could not require or induce this
30. Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 1121.
31. Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1347-51.
32. Epstein, supra note 3, at 12.
33. The religion clauses might be a partial exception to this principle. As Profes-
sor Marshall points out in this symposium, the combination of the free exercise and es-
tablishment clauses alters the permissible baseline of government benefits. Marshall, To-
wards A Nonunifying Theory Of Unconstitutional Conditions: The Example of the
Religion Clauses 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 243 (1989). Indeed, the establishment clause is
unique in forbidding the government from subsidizing an activity that is otherwise enti-
tled to some constitutional protection. The issue arises most acutely when the government
considers immunizing religious groups from an otherwise general regulation. Is immunity
an establishment of religion? But is failure to immunize a penalty on free exercise?
indirectly, either.3 4
But this position is too extreme. If we again consider the above
doctrinal categories, we will see that in each, "indirect" infringe-
ments via government grants or benefits are sometimes less problem-
atic than "direct" infringements."5 In short, although the "greater
includes the lesser" argument is overstated, there is something to it.
1. Equality Principles
Is there a relevant difference here? Is there any case in which a
classification would violate equality principles if imposed "directly,"
but would not violate equality if attached to a government
"benefit"?
Yes. A classification that would be unjustifiable if imposed di-
rectly might be permissible if imposed as a condition to a govern-
ment benefit, if it is sufficiently tailored to the unique government
benefit program. To use one of Kreimer's examples, a government
arts program for painters could give grants to cubists but not pointil-
lists, if program officials could make a plausible case that cubists
have greater artistic merit.3" But the government could hardly make
it a crime to paint in a pointillist style.
Still, equality principles are not intrinsically different when ap-
plied to "gratuitous" government benefits rather than to other con-
texts. Although unique government justifications might be available
in the case of government largesse, the degree of judicial scrutiny
itself does not ordinarily vary."'
2. Nonequality Principles
a. Impermissible Deterrent Effect on a Right
Sometimes the "indirect" condition is less "burdensome" than the
"direct" one, in the behavioral sense: it may deter exercise of the
right to a much lesser extent. In Sherbert, perhaps the situation is in
fact as hypothesized above: the statute has no behavioral effect other
than inducing all persons in Mrs. Sherbert's position to give up their
unemployment benefits. By contrast, a criminal penalty for not seek-
34. The Court in Sherbert gave virtually this response, reasoning that "forc[ing]
[appellant Mrs. Sherbert] to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning the precepts of her religion in order
to accept work, on the other hand . . . puts the same kind of burden upon the free
exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship."
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
35. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1422 n.22; Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1448 (1968).
36. Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1374-75.
37. The obvious exception is the fundamental interest branch of equal protection
analysis. See Simons, Equality, supra note 15, at 467-72, for a detailed analysis.
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ing work on Saturday would certainly deter the exercise of the right
much more.
b. Impermissible Motive
Perhaps the government is more likely to have a permissible mo-
tive in the "grant" or "benefit" context. The government may have
sensible reasons for attaching conditions to benefits, conditions that
may unfortunately, but not deliberately and impermissibly, burden
constitutional choices. For example, suppose welfare benefits are
only provided to current residents of a state. This policy may deter
the right to travel out of state, but it is not so motivated. Compare a
law that criminalizes travel out of state. It is much more difficult to
discern a legitimate motive for this "direct" infringement.
c. Inconsistent with the Relevant Constitutional Values
Sometimes, apart from the above arguments, a government benefit
program may legitimately affect constitutional rights in a way that a
"direct" penalty may not. Consider a variation of Sherbert. Apart
from an unemployment system, government could not directly re-
quire all citizens to seek work on pain of criminal penalty; but gov-
ernment can surely require citizens to seek work as a condition of
obtaining unemployment benefits. Or again, society has a greater in-
terest in preventing campaigning by government employees than in
preventing campaigning by private employees, because of the special
danger that elected officials will require their employees to assist
their campaigns. 8
Again, this last category is the one in which UC and GIL issues
arise most acutely. I will try to show that the offer/threat distinction
helps identify the cases in which the condition on a government ben-
efit is less troublesome than a directly imposed condition would be.
C. Distinguishing Three Concepts
1. Waiver and Consent
Do unconstitutional conditions cases necessarily involve waiver of
a right or consent to its infringement? If the recipient is aware of the
conditions and "chooses" the benefit anyway, does she have no cause
to complain?
38. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973).
"Waiver" and "consent" are malleable and controversial concepts.
They are not sufficient grounds for precluding every unconstitutional
conditions claim.39 Often recipients are not fully aware of the condi-
tions; often they have a constricted practical choice; sometimes it is
simply unfair for the government to put certain kinds of choices to
them;40 and some constitutional rights are entirely unwaivable or
inalienable."'
2. Coercion
The concept of coercion is sometimes used loosely in this area, but
it is usually inapposite. Under a strict definition of "coercion," a gov-
ernment actor "coerces" a recipient only if, among other things, the
actor intends that she not exercise a right, and she in fact does not
exercise the right. 2 In Sherbert, for example, the government did
not really "coerce" Mrs. Sherbert to violate her religious convictions,
since there is no reason to believe that the motivation for adopting a
uniform policy requiring Saturday work was to induce religious per-
sons to give up their Sabbath. Mrs. Sherbert did suffer a kind of
"penalty," however, and that penalty still might constitute an uncon-
stitutional condition. Courts sometimes appear to use "coercion" as a
term of art for "penalty. '4 3 That usage is innocuous as long as it is
understood to be somewhat hyperbolic.
Although the concept of coercion usually does not strictly apply, I
will later review a number of philosophical discussions of coercion,
because those discussions carefully explore the distinction between
threats and offers.
3. Refusal to Subsidize
The abortion funding cases44 are sometimes described as unconsti-
tutional conditions cases.45 If the government refuses to fund abor-
tion, the argument goes, then it is conditioning otherwise available
39. See generally Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1382-93; Rosenthal, supra note 11, at
1153-54.
40. See Westen, Rueful Rhetoric, supra note 1, at 1012-15.
41. See Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1386-90. See generally Radin, Market-Inalien-
ability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987). For example, the government may not purchase
your right to vote, or bribe you to be a slave. Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1386. Professor
Sullivan persuasively argues that no theory of inalienability can explain all unconstitu-
tional conditions cases. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1476-89. But I agree with Kreimer that
such a theory can explain a subset of cases.
42. See generally Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion" - Virtue Words and Vice
Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541 (1985); A. WERTHEIMER, COERCION 202-03 (1987). See
also Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1454-56.
43. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958). See also Sullivan,
supra note 3, at 1435-36.
44. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
45. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1439-40.
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medical benefits on the recipient's nonassertion of a constitutional
right. But I agree with Professor Tribe and others that a "refusal to
subsidize" is different from a classic unconstitutional condition.46
Consider two examples that illuminate the difference. First, a clas-
sic unconstitutional condition issue would arise if the government
paid for both abortion and childbirth, but gave an extra bonus for
those who chose to carry a child to term. The bonus might or might
not be valid, but it would indeed raise the unconstitutional condition
issue directly. By contrast, a refusal to fund abortions does not con-
dition any government "benefit" other than the benefit of reimburse-
ment for the medical cost of exercising the constitutional right. If
the pregnant woman does not have the abortion, she does not incur
that medical cost, so it is a little odd to say that a "benefit" has been
conditioned on her nonassertion of a right to an abortion."7
A second example of a classic unconstitutional condition issue is a
government policy denying food stamps to women who obtained
abortions. Indeed, curiously enough, a withdrawal of a government
benefit worth less to the woman than government funding of abor-
tions could be unconstitutional. Suppose the government pays for
abortions and childbirth, but imposes a one time, fifty dollar reduc-
tion of welfare benefits if a woman obtains an abortion. Even the
Maher and Harris Courts would have invalidated such a plan!4 8
Refusals to fund do raise serious constitutional issues. When they
are selective, they raise equal protection issues. And sometimes the
government has some affirmative duty to fund exercise of a constitu-
tional right.49 But refusals to fund need to be analyzed somewhat
46. See L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 781-82 (2d ed. 1988). Tribe,
supra note 4, at 254-56.
47. See Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights. Affirma-
tive Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330 (1985). Or consider
the example given in Harris, 448 U.S. at 318. A citizen has a constitutional right to
attend private schools if she wishes; the government nevertheless may constitutionally
fund public but not private schools. This is not an unconstitutional condition because the
citizen is "penalized" only in the sense that the government does not pay for her exercise
of the constitutional right.
48. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 n.8 ("if Connecticut denied general welfare ben-
efits to all women who had obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the
benefits, we would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro [v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969)], and strict scrutiny might be appropriate . . . . But the claim here is that
the State 'penalizes' the woman's decision to have an abortion by refusing to pay for
it."); Harris 448 U.S. at 317 n.19.
49. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (government must
waive filing fees for divorce, since it monopolizes the legal institution of marriage and
divorce); see also Tribe, supra note 4, at 257-59 (arguing, based on Boddie, that govern-
ment has affirmative duty to fund abortions for poor women even if it does not provide
differently than true unconstitutional conditions.
PART III
THE THREAT/OFFER DISTINCTION, AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
A. Unpacking the Threat/Offer Example
Recall the earlier hypothetical example of a government experi-
ment that randomly selects a group of citizens to explore the effects
of their remaining silent for two days. I compared an offer or bribe,
by which citizens who remain silent receive a $200 tax reduction, to
a threat, by which citizens who choose not to remain silent receive a
$200 tax increase.
Why is the offer constitutional, while the threat is unconstitu-
tional? In either case, it costs the individual $200 to speak those two
days, either by giving up the opportunity for a tax break, or by suf-
fering a tax penalty.
I will examine several possible explanations in turn.
(1) Perhaps people value the loss of an opportunity less than they
value the loss of something they already have. This sounds reasona-
ble, at first glance. Indeed, it finds support in the economic
literature.5 °
But the argument is insufficient. For suppose the offer were in-
creased to a $1,000 bribe, while the threat remained at $200. The
bribe would still be permissible, while the threat would not be. In-
deed, the disparity could be increased even further, yet we would
still object much more to the threat.
(2) Perhaps the threat is more objectionable because it puts more
actual pressure on the constitutional right, in the following sense:
More people will in fact choose not to assert their constitutional
right to speak if they are penalized for speaking than if they are
merely rewarded for not speaking.
But again, the argument is insufficient. For the threat is more
troublesome than the offer even if we are confident that the behav-
ioral consequences are identical; for example, suppose both a threat
of losing $200 if you speak and an offer of receiving $200 if you
remain silent will cause sixty out of 100 persons to remain silent.
any other free medical assistance, because otherwise the right is meaningless); Tushnet,
The Supreme Court on Abortion, in ABORTION, MEDICINE AND THE LAW (J.D. Butler &
D. Walbert eds. 1986) (decision not to subsidize the poor may constitute a "burden"
because government allocates most of the goods that the poor consume).
50. See C. GILLETTE & T. HOPKINS, FEDERAL AGENCY VALUATIONS OF HUMAN
LIFE: A REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 49-50
(Dec. 1988) (citing Knetch & Sinden, Willingness-to-Pay And Compensation De-
manded: Experimental Evidence Of An Unexpected Disparity In Measures Value, 99
Q.J ECON. 507 (1984); Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, And Ideol-
ogy in the Coase Theorem, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1187 (1980)).
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Indeed, the threat is more troublesome even if the behavioral conse-
quences are somewhat "worse" under the offer; for example, suppose
a larger offer of $1,000 will cause eighty out of 100 to remain silent,
while the threat of loss of $100 will cause fifty out of 100 to remain
silent.51
(3) Perhaps the recipient's response to the offer is more "volun-
tary" than her response to the threat.
Again, this is unpersuasive. In each case, the citizen has a real
choice, and she will suffer the same financial consequence from
choosing speech. "Voluntary" might describe the more complex con-
cept of a fair choice, but if so, I think it clearer to analyze the fair-
ness of the choice directly, as I do below.
(4) Perhaps the offer increases the citizen's options, while the
threat decreases them.
This is a common explanation of the threat/offer distinction. 2
Strictly speaking, however, the explanation fails. Although the offer
gives the citizen a "new" option of receiving money if she declines to
speak, it also imposes a "new" penalty, for it imposes on the citizen
who chooses to speak an opportunity cost that did not previously ex-
ist. She now lacks an option she once had - the option of speaking
without the temptation or inducement to increase her welfare by re-
maining silent. To be sure, such an opportunity cost is more ethereal
than a penalty that actually lowers her welfare. But to deny that it is
a real cost seems to beg the question.
The argument that the offer increases one's options might refer,
not to the novelty of the option, but to the fact that citizens will
51. See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 42, at 204 ("It is important to see that the
distinction between threats and offers is not a function of the distance between the op-
tions or their efficacy in securing the desired response.")(emphasis original).
There are two other problems with the argument. First, the argument is a contingent
empirical assertion which in some circumstances may be false. Second, the relative pay-
ment amounts could easily be adjusted (as in argument (1), above) to equalize the
incentives.
52. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note I, at 1354; A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 42, at
211, 232; J. FEINBERG. HARM TO SELF 230 (1986).
Professor Day has stated this argument in more sophisticated form. If I understand
him, he would translate the argument as follows: Prior to the threat (b), the citizen can
unconditionally keep both her present level of taxes and her freedom to speak, whereas
after the threat she cannot do both of these things. By contrast, prior to the offer (a), she
cannot unconditionally keep both the offered tax break and her freedom to speak. In
order to get the offered tax break, she must give up her freedom. So the "offer does not
make [her] unable to do something [she] can unconditionally now do." But the govern-
ment's threat (b) "deprives [her] by making [her] (about to be) unable to do something
which [she] can unconditionally now do." Day, Threats, Offers, Law, Opinion and Lib-
erty, 14 Am. PHIL. Q. 257, 259 (1977) (emphasis original).
ordinarily prefer the option to the threat. As Robert Nozick explains
in his classic article, people ordinarily welcome offers but not
threats.53 This psychological fact is indeed relevant to the justifica-
tion behind the threat/offer distinction. But I think the insight
within this fourth argument is better explained differently, as reflect-
ing that the government's use of the threat is presumptively unfair.
See arguments (7) and (8), below.
(5) Perhaps the "penalty" is objectionable because it creates ine-
quality between those "random conscripts" subject to the condition
and all other citizens.
But so does the "offer." And even if inequality with respect to
burdens is more objectionable than inequality with respect to bene-
fits,514 the hypothetical could be altered to eliminate this objection:
(a) all citizens would be eligible for the offer if they remain silent,
versus (b) all citizens would be subject to the penalty if they speak. I
originally hypothesized a random selection device only to make the
example seem more realistic.
(6) Perhaps government is less constrained when it is acting in a
proprietary capacity, like a private actor. The offer is something that
a private individual could provide. This is even clearer if the govern-
ment offer is in the form of money, rather than a tax break. By
contrast, a private individual could not threaten an individual in the
same way, for the private individual lacks a general power to coerce
or tax.55
But I am unconvinced. The offer/threat distinction seems robust
even when the government is offering a uniquely governmental bene-
fit. Suppose the government increases food stamp benefits by a cer-
tain amount, or lowers taxes by that amount, if beneficiaries/taxpay-
ers agree never to have an abortion. This is an offer, as compared to
lowering benefits or increasing taxes if beneficiaries/taxpayers do
have abortions. But a private individual cannot offer food stamps or
tax relief, so the offer is not a "proprietary"-type power.56
(7) Perhaps the government has no legitimate interest in employ-
ing a threat when it could use an offer. Its only actual interest is a
selfish desire to save money. After all, the government seeks some
53. Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD 440, 460 (S.
Morgenbesser, P. Suppes & M. White eds. 1969).
54. See, e.g., Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion, supra note 16, at 506-
09.
55. I thank Joseph Brodley for this suggestion.
56. See also Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1315-24, for several cogent criticisms of
the sovereign/proprietary distinction: government can deter just as effectively with fines
or withdrawal of monetary benefits as with direct imprisonment or taxation; proprietary
sanctions are often larger than sovereign ones; proprietary sanctions are easier to apply
because the recipient seeks out the government; and even the most "private" of govern-
ment enterprises is ultimately backed up by taxes.
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benefit from the exchange, to wit, information that will benefit soci-
ety. It is exploiting the citizenry. And, for that reason, citizens
might understandably experience the threat as a qualitatively more
severe burden or penalty than they would experience the correspond-
ing offer.
This, I agree, is a significant point. And the point remains signifi-
cant if, instead of viewing the "government" as a distinct entity, we
view it as the collection of citizens who are taxed to pay the offer, or
who receive a tax benefit as a result of the penalty. In the case of the
offer, the cost of inducing silence is distributed across the general
population; in the case of the threat, that cost is concentrated upon
the "conscripts," and the general population receives a commensu-
rate financial benefit. Since the social benefit of the program accrues
to the public generally, prima facie the offer distributes the financial
cost of the program more fairly.5
But by the same token, if the government has exhausted the offer
approach without success, it then has much better reason for em-
ploying the threat approach.5 9 Suppose the government tried to bribe
people not to speak, but almost no one accepted the bribe, even a
very large bribe. Then the government has a much better case for
"drafting" some people not to speak, and penalizing them if they
refuse to do so - assuming that this will in fact induce more people
to comply. This point still underscores that the offer is much less
troublesome. In doctrinal terms, perhaps the government should only
be permitted to use a threat if it can show that the "less restrictive
alternative" of an offer is inadequate. 60
(8) Perhaps the citizen has "given" the government something in
this hypothetical, so she deserves something in return. The threat
scenario is upsetting because the government "gets something for
nothing." 61 Again, the government exploits its citizens.
57. See Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1372 ("This [prediction] baseline has the
happy property of forcing the government to pay fair measure for the forfeiture of rights.
It cannot purchase rights by granting benefits that the victim would receive anyhow.").
58. See also Epstein, supra note 3, at 25 (implicitly arguing that the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine should properly serve distributive justice as well as allocative
efficiency); McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions: Unrecognized Implications For The
Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255 (1989) (emphasizing that government
largesse is ultimately derived from broad-based taxation).
59. I thank Clayton Gillette for this point.
60. For a general analysis of the "less restrictive alternative" doctrine, see
Simons, supra note 16, at 485-88. An offer would ordinarily be "less restrictive" in the
sense of imposing a lesser burden, not in the sense of restricting an appropriately smaller
class. See id. at 488.
61. See Frankfurt, Coercion and Moral Responsibility, in EssAYs ON FREEDOM
This, too, is a sound objection. Compare our reactions to the fol-
lowing examples.'The city of Boston might offer a "bribe" not to
drive in Boston, or it might charge a toll for driving in (or into)
Boston. But the second option does not seem especially "threat"-en-
ing, even though it affects a "right to travel," because the driver
imposes costs on the city. Or consider the government's imposition of
a marriage license fee to defray administrative costs. This burden on
the right to marry is hardly objectionable.6 2
Of course, the government can require citizens to "give something
for nothing" in some circumstances, namely, civic obligations of mil-
itary service and jury duty.63 The rationale, in part, is that citizens
get innumerable benefits from the government. If unlimited, this ra-
tionale would obliterate the threat/offer distinction and would allow
an unlimited degree of "conscription" of citizens. I can only respond
that that prospect is a very unhappy one in a constitutional democ-
racy that respects individual liberties.
In sum, a threat is more troubling than the corresponding offer for
the following basic reason: The threat is exploitative, at least when
the affected citizenry have neither received a reciprocal benefit nor
contributed to the social problem that the threat or offer is designed
to remedy. The next section elaborates on this conclusion.
B. The Significance of the Threat/Offer Distinction
The threat/offer distinction expresses this basic norm: If the gov-
ernment wishes to induce conduct that a citizen has a right not to
engage in, government needs a greater justification for burdening
those who stand on their rights than for benefiting those who give up
their rights. And this is true regardless of how laudable or important
the government's goal is.
More precisely, I conclude that the threat to reduce otherwise
available government benefits, or to increase otherwise required tax
burdens, if a recipient asserts a right is more constitutionally troub-
lesome than the offer to increase otherwise available government
OF ACTION 65, 83 (T. Honderich ed. 1973) ("A threat, unlike an offer, exposes a person
to the risk of an additional penalty without providing him with any opportunity to ac-
quire a benefit which would otherwise not have been available to him.").
62. Indeed, the corresponding offer would probably be unconstitutional, precisely
because it does not reflect costs created by the citizen. Imagine that a marriage registry
office offered a small bribe to would-be married couples to induce them not to marry.
Although this peculiar policy would rationally serve the interest of lowering government
administrative costs, it is not properly linked to the costs that the citizens' actions (not
getting married) impose on government.
63. The government does pay military and jury conscripts, but it relies on com-
pulsion and legal duty rather than a market rate to induce service. (The volunteer mili-
tary service is an exception.) Indeed, the government could probably require jury and
military duty without any pay.
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benefits, or to reduce otherwise required tax burdens, if a recipient
does not assert a right. Of course, offers can still be unconstitu-
tional, 4 and threats can still be constitutional. But the threat should
be subject to higher judicial scrutiny than the offer. At the very
least, the government should not be permitted to employ the threat if
the (less restrictive) offer is a reasonably effective alternative. More-
over, the threat to lower someone's "gratuitous" benefits should ordi-
narily receive the same searching scrutiny that a direct regulation of
the person's conduct would receive. So in my "threat to speech" ex-
ample, judicial scrutiny should ordinarily be just as strict whether
the government increases taxes, reduces otherwise available welfare
benefits, or imposes a civil or criminal fine for refusing to remain
silent for two days. 5
Why is the threat more troublesome? The prior discussion sug-
gests an answer. The government exploits 6 its citizens and treats
them unfairly when it extracts a contribution from them without ei-
ther (a) offering a reciprocal benefit in return, or (b) demonstrating
that they have contributed in a distinct way to the problem they
64. Consider the earlier example of the government offering citizens $20,000 not
to attend church or synagogue. Or consider Kreimer's illustration of the hypothetical
"prediction" test, a test which I otherwise endorse. Kreimer supposes that a city will
build a highway on Route 1 or Route 2. Route 2 is more technically desirable, and the
planners recommend it to the mayor. But this route also will greatly ease newspaper
distribution for the major city paper, which is critical of the mayor. The mayor an-
nounces that he will choose Route 1 unless the paper stops criticizing him, in which case
he will choose Route 2. This is a threat, Kreimer explains, because the city would have
gone with Route 2 anyway. Now change the assumptions: suppose Route 1 was techni-
cally better and would have been chosen "in the normal course of events." If the mayor
makes the same announcement, he is making an offer. Kreimer, supra note I, at 1371-
72.
I agree with Kreimer's analysis here of the distinction between threats and offers. But
the example is ill-chosen, because even the offer is probably unconstitutional. The city
cannot even offer a positive inducement to the paper if the city's purpose is to quell
criticism.
65. Whether a proposal is an offer or a threat might also be relevant to whether
the constitutional right has been burdened. That is, "withdrawing an offer" might not be
considered a burden at all, while "imposing a threat" might be considered a clear bur-
den. But I do not pursue this issue here. For a different proposed criterion of when the
burden threshold has been met, see Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens
on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989).
66. I use the term "exploitation" somewhat loosely. Although philosophers have
defended a number of specific conceptions, the conceptions usually include the notion
that one party has taken advantage of another party's weakness or dependency. For some
discussions, see J. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 242-49 (1986); Feinberg, Noncoercive Ex-
ploitation, in PATERNALISM 201-35 (R. Sartorius ed. 1983); A. WERTHEIMER, supra note
42, at 225-41, That notion seems apt when a government increases taxes or reduces bene-
fits in order to induce desired conduct, at least when it could employ the less restrictive
alternative of an offer.
have been "drafted" to remedy.67 And if we characterize the "ex-
ploiting" party not as "the government" in some detached sense, but
as the group of citizens and taxpayers that government represents,
the unfair treatment point is simply reformulated: judicial scrutiny
should be greater when the general population has extracted social
benefits from a subgroup without offering some specific benefit in
return or without proof that the subgroup has helped cause the
problem.
Consider some exceptions that "prove" this general rule. In tak-
ings law, citizens can fairly be asked to accept zoning restrictions
that promote an "average reciprocity of advantage," that is, that are
to the benefit of all persons subject to the restriction."8 But it would
stretch that principle too far to say that every government program
that employs a threat to serve a legitimate end is to the benefit of all
citizens. In my "threat to speech" example, those who choose to
speak will usually pay a price that is highly disproportionate to the
benefits they receive from the experiment. Or again, government
probably may require those who wish to engage in large public ral-
lies to pay some reasonable proportion of the clean-up costs, assum-
ing that the policy is nondiscriminatory. Indeed, paradoxically, the
comparable offer is more troublesome: I doubt that it would be con-
stitutional for the government to offer a bribe to the organizers of
the rally to induce them to cancel it!
The baseline for measuring threats and offers, as I will shortly
explain, is roughly this: What the government would have provided
the citizen apart from the condition, that is, if it could not impose
the condition. At first glance, this baseline seems perplexing. It
seems to derive an "ought" from an "is." That is, it seems to base
the moral and constitutional distinction that threats are more troub-
lesome than offers on how government normally would have acted,
not on how government should have acted. And I am old-fashioned
enough to believe that an "ought" cannot be derived from an "is."
What, then, is the explanation?
Basing the threat/offer distinction on what the government would
normally have done does not derive an "ought" from an "is."
Rather, it merely recognizes that government threatens liberty more
acutely when government takes a step that newly burdens those who
stand on their rights than when government takes a step that newly
benefits those who give up their rights. Or, to put the matter a little
differently, once the government legitimately sets a baseline for ben-
efits and burdens, the individual has a qualified kind of entitlement
67. Although (a) and (b) are two important categories in which "threats" are not
especially troublesome, other categories that I have not identified might also exist.
68. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)
(discussing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 459 (1922)).
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to that baseline - in the special sense that government ordinarily
needs as strong a reason for lowering the individual from the base-
line as it needs when it directly punishes or regulates.6 9 To fully ex-
plain this point, however, requires a closer look at the requisite
baseline.
C. The Hypothetical Descriptive Baseline
The appropriate baseline for measuring threats and offers is both
hypothetical and descriptive. Government threatens a citizen if it
proposes to condition the continuation of the benefits/burdens she
would otherwise receive on her not doing X, when she has a right to
do X. That is, if she does X, her benefits will decrease or her burdens
will increase as compared to what she would otherwise receive. But
government makes an offer if it proposes to condition an increase in
benefits or a decrease in burdens she would otherwise receive on her
not doing X.
A critical term here is "otherwise." How do we determine what
the recipient would "otherwise" receive? What is being excluded
from the situation, and what is being included? Philosophers and le-
gal writers who have studied the necessary and sufficient conditions
of coercion"0 have described the hypothetical baseline with such va-
ried terms as "normal," "statistical," "predictive," "expected," and
"nonmoral,'7 1 and many have struggled with this problem of defini-
tion.7 12 Suppose that P is in a position to save Q, who is drowning. P
69. This also answers one of Sullivan's objections to a "coercion" theory. She
persuasively argues that a normative concept of coercion is a doubtful solution to the
unconstitutional condition problem, since that problem only arises when the benefit is
constitutionally gratuitous: "[t]o hold that conditions coerce recipients because they
make them worse off with respect to a benefit than they ought to be runs against the
ground rules of the negative Constitution on which the unconstitutional conditions prob-
lem rests." Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1450 (emphasis original). I agree. But the argu-
ment simply demonstrates that the threat/offer baseline should be what the recipient
otherwise would have received, not what she otherwise ought to have received. For fur-
ther discussion, see The Hypothetical Descriptive Baseline, infra text at notes 70-85.
70. As noted above, I am not supposing that the government literally coerces citi-
zens when it employs a threat rather than an offer. See supra text at notes 42-43. The
philosophical literature is nevertheless illuminating, since the analysis of baselines is an
important part of the analysis of coercion.
71. See J. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 216-28 (1986) (endorsing a "statistical" or"expectation" baseline); Nozick, supra note 53 ("normal," "expected," and "predicted");
A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 42, at 206-11 (discussing two kinds of "nonmoral" baselines
- the "statistical" and the "phenomenological"); Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers,
10 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 121 (1981)("normally expected course of events").
72. See, e.g., Nozick, supra note 53, at 451-52; A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 42,
at 206-22; Zimmerman, supra note 71, at 124-38; J. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 216-28
offers to save Q but only if Q pays P a large sum of money. Has P
made an offer or 'a threat? 73 Or suppose that R ordinarily beats his
slave S every day, for no reason.7 4 One day, R proposes not to beat S
if S will perform a slightly disagreeable task. Has R made an offer
or a threat?
I believe that the most appropriate test is what the proposer would
have done if he had not been permitted to attach to his offer the
condition to which the recipient objects.75 So P has made an offer if,
in this hypothetical world where the conditioned offer was prevented,
he would not have saved Q. On the other hand, if in this counterfac-
tual world he would have saved Q, then his attaching an extra condi-
tion is a threat. On this view, R has clearly made an offer to S,
because if the conditioned proposal were not permitted, R would oth-
erwise have beaten S, and the proposal is an improvement relative to
that baseline. Finally, in my original example, the proposal to grant
tax relief if the citizen agrees to remain silent is an offer because, if
the government could not impose the condition of not speaking, it
would not have granted unconditional tax relief; it is offering that
relief only to induce silence. And the proposal to increase taxes if the
citizen does not agree to remain silent is a threat because, apart
from that condition, the government would not have increased
taxes. 6
(1986); C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 95-
97 (1981).
Surprisingly, however, many scholars who have discussed this hypothetical descriptive
baseline have been somewhat casual about how to identify what the proposer would oth-
erwise have done. See, e.g., Lyons, Welcome Threats and Coercive Offers, 50 PHIL. 425,
436 (1975)("Q knows that P would have given x to Q, on easier terms, if the chance had
not arisen to trade x for y"); Westen, supra note 42, at 588-89 (the descriptive test asks
what the recipient would "otherwise" expect her situation to be, "in the absence of [the]
proposal").
73. For a careful discussion of this example embracing four different possible
"baseline" criteria, see J. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 220-21 (1986).
74. The example is from Nozick, supra note 53, at 450. It has prompted much
discussion, See Westen, supra note 42, at 582-86; Zimmerman, supra note 71, at 126-3 1;
J. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 221-22 (1986); A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 42, at 208-09.
75. Strictly speaking, we should add to the underlined phrase something like the
following: "Or a similarly objectionable condition." Thus, if, counterfactually, P were not
permitted to demand a large sum of money from Q for rescuing him, then obviously he
would have demanded a slightly smaller sum of money. This type of alternative proposal
should also be excluded, for we want to know what P would have done if he could not
charge any sum of money for rescuing Q. But I recognize that I have not defined this
additional qualification precisely.
76. The test that I propose is very similar to the "predictive" prong of Kreimer's
test for distinguishing threats from offers. See Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1371-74. In
Kreimer's words, "the normal course of events is the course of events that would follow if
the government could not impose the condition in question, or could not take the exer-
cise of constitutional rights into account" (emphasis added). I differ from Kreimer
slightly, for I would omit the italicized phrase. The relevant question, I think, is whether
the particular condition actually imposed is unconstitutional, so that should be the focus
of the hypothetical inquiry. Whether the government could take the exercise of constitu-
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This analysis prompts several objections. First, how can the analy-
sis of threats and offers ignore the immorality or illegality of the
baseline? R has no right to beat S, even if that is what he normally
does. Slavery and brutality are immoral. This objection is important,
but ultimately unconvincing. Of course S has a right that R not beat
him, and a right not to be enslaved. So S has a right not to be at
that baseline. Yet that is a different issue from whether, given that
baseline, the proposal is a threat or an offer. S can directly assert the
right not to be at the baseline, but we should not confuse matters by
claiming that that is relevant to whether he has suffered a threat or
instead received an offer. For example, if R were to propose to beat
S twice as hard as usual for refusing to perform the disagreeable
task, that would be more problematic (a threat) than his actual pro-
posal not to beat S if S does perform the task (an offer).
Consider the same objection in relation to another example. Sup-
pose prison officials place a troublesome prisoner in solitary confine-
ment and impose horrendous conditions that violate the eighth
amendment. They propose to release him from confinement, how-
ever, if he agrees to assist them in uncovering crimes committed by
other inmates. Again, the proposal is an offer, relative to the unfor-
tunate baseline. (Compare this to a threat to worsen his conditions of
incarceration if he refuses to help.) It is the original baseline, and
not the new proposal itself, that makes the victim worse off than he
is entitled to be. The victim should directly claim his entitlement not
to be at that baseline. But the government's failure to honor the
original entitlement does not convert the new proposal from an offer
into a threat.77
A second objection to my analysis is more troubling. It is not
merely difficult to know what the proposer would have done if he
tional rights into account in any other way, with a different condition, is not directly
relevant.
77. In terms of the philosophical debate, I am arguing for a "nonmoral" rather
than a "moral" baseline. See J. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 216-28 (1986); Zimmerman,
supra note 71, at 124-31; A. WERTHEIMER, COERCION 206-11 (1987); see also Seidman,
supra note 3, at 78-79. However, the "nonmoral" terminology does not mean that the
threat/offer distinction itself is not of moral significance. See my discussion of deriving
an "ought" from an "is," supra text at note 69.
Some scholars have argued for a baseline that is partly or entirely normative rather
than descriptive. See, e.g., A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 42, at 204-31; Westen, supra
note 42, at 576-77, 582-89; Nozick, supra note 53, at 447, 450; C. FRIED, supra note 72,
at 97. That position may be sensible as part of a definition of coercive threats; for not all
threats are coercive. See A. WERTIHEIMER, supra note 42, at 214 (noting Haksar, Coer-
cive Proposals, 4 POL. THEORY 65, 67 (1976)). But that position is especially doubtful as
applied to the unconstitutional conditions problem. See supra note 69.
could not have made the conditioned proposal; the question may
even be incoherent. Maybe P is the kind of person who always tries
to make money from the distress of others. If that were forbidden to
him, what would he do? Or consider an example closer to our legal
hearts: A governor proposes to commute a sentence if the prisoner
agrees to participate in dangerous medical experiments. Would the
governor have commuted the sentence "otherwise," that is, if she
knew she was forbidden from making the conditioned offer? We can
imagine clear polar cases. An offer: She had never commuted a sen-
tence before, and this new policy is the only ground that she has ever
thought sufficient for commutation. A threat: She has a definite set
of criteria, other than participation in an experiment, that she has
always used before, and the prisoner would have been entitled to
commutation under that policy. But what is the proper analysis for
cases between these extremes?
The last example reveals a third potential problem with the hypo-
thetical descriptive test. Isn't the proposer entitled to change his cri-
teria' over time? History should not be a straightjacket. If the pro-
poser has legitimate reasons for changing the baseline level of
benefits and burdens, then how can we make sense of what the recip-
ient would "otherwise" have received?
This "shifting sands" objection is overstated, however. Sometimes
we can indeed apply the hypothetical test, even though the underly-
ing baseline might shift. The hypothetical test is not a historical
one.78 Consider the following two examples that elaborate upon the
original hypothetical.
(1) The shifting sands offer: The government announces that all
welfare beneficiaries who agree to remain silent for two days will get
a $200 benefit increase next year. But it also announces that, in ad-
dition to this first condition, all benefits shall be decreased by $200
next year across the board. The beneficiary has received an offer,
even though the net effect is that beneficiaries who remain silent get
78. In this respect, my test differs from Kreimer's. Kreimer would allow history
to be an important (though not determinative) factor in determining the appropriate
baseline, Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1359-63. My proposed test, instead, relies essentially
on what Kreimer calls the "predictive" test. Id. at 1371-74.
1 also reject Kreimer's partial reliance on an equality baseline for differentiating
threats from offers. As Kreimer explains: "The normal course of events, under this inter-
pretation, is the course of events that is the statistical norm: what happens to everyone
else. . . . [Tihe more a government's . . . choices tend to single out for exclusion from
otherwise available benefits those who exercise a particular right, the more that choice
appears to penalize that exercise." Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1363-67. Yet this analysis
seems parasitic on the "prediction" test: the right is "singled out" only in the sense that,
but for exercise of the right, we can predict that the government would have offered the
benefit. See also Simons, Equality, supra note 15, at 448 n.138. Of course, in some cases
equality principles such as equal protection directly apply, but then the "gratuitous" sta-
tus of the benefit is ordinarily irrelevant. See supra text at notes 15-18, 36-37.
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the same benefits next year as this year, while beneficiaries who
stand on their rights get a smaller benefit. It is an offer so long as
the government really did have valid, independent reasons for apply-
ing the across-the-board decrease. And it is an offer because the gov-
ernment will place her in a better position than she would otherwise
have occupied next year if she waives her right. The government will
not be placing her in a worse condition than she otherwise would
have occupied next year if she refuses to waive her rights.7 9
Note that under a purely historical baseline, she has been
threatened. Such a baseline is unpersuasive, for it forbids the govern-
ment from changing its policies over time. As Professor Westen ex-
plains, "[t]he question is not whether the proposal conditionally
promises to leave a recipient worse off than he is, or worse off than
he has been, but whether it conditionally promises to leave him
worse off than he otherwise will be."8
(2) The shifting sands pseudo-offer: As before, the government
purports to offer a $200 benefit increase if the recipient agrees to
remain silent, and independently to reduce benefits $200 across-the-
board compared to this year. But actually, it never had any indepen-
dent reason for the reduction. Now, the government really is using
the threat method rather than the offer method. The result is the
same as in the first example, in one sense: The recipient's benefits
will be the same as last year if she agrees to waive her rights, and
$200 lower than last year if she does not agree to waive her rights.
But the absence of any legitimate, independent reason for the benefit
decrease transmutes the offer into a threat.8"
The test is nonhistorical with respect to not only the level of bene-
79. To be sure, she will not be better off than this year as a result of waiving her
rights, since she will get the same level of benefits. And she will in fact be worse off than
this year if she refuses to waive her rights, since her benefits will decrease. But these are
not the relevant comparisons.
80. Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion," supra note 42, at 579 (emphasis in orig-
inal). Other commentators also support a predictive rather than historical baseline. See
A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 42, at 205; Benditt, Threats and Offers, 58 THE PERSONAL-
IST 382 (1977) (a threat includes, inter alia, the proposal: "I will prevent your present
situation from improving unless you do A"); Frankfurt, supra note 61, at 69. Westen and
these other commentators do not restrict their analysis to governmental "proposers."
81. Consider French's analysis of Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
French claims that one cannot easily distinguish a penalty from a withdrawal of a bene-
fit, because "there would be an identity of effect whether the state imposed a uniform tax
increase concurrent with an equivalent exemption for all persons signing loyalty oaths, or
merely imposed a special tax on all non-signers." French, supra note 29, at 246. But
despite the identity of effect, ordinarily the exemption is an offer and the special tax is a
threat, for the reasons explained in the text.
fits, but also the imposition of the condition, though the two are in-
terrelated. If the government has provided a $200 tax rebate to each
citizen the last several years, it may nevertheless offer the rebate this
year only to those who remain silent for two days, without having
the offer characterized as a threat - so long as the government re-
ally had decided independently not to continue the across-the-board
rebate. 2
Note that the test is a hypothetical judgment about what the pro-
poser would otherwise provide, not a judgment about what the of-
feree or victim expects that she will otherwise receive.83 Although
these judgments will usually be the same, they will differ if the re-
cipient is mistaken about what the government is otherwise planning
to do. So, in the first shifting sands example above, if the recipient
had no idea that the government had adopted the two policies, and if
the recipient did not remain silent for two days, her welfare benefits
would decrease next year as compared to this year, and she might
feel that she had been threatened. In fact, however, she has not been
threatened."4 Her mistaken perception does not transform legitimate
82. Similarly, a government that has never before imposed a work requirement as
a condition of welfare may suddenly decide to do so, but that policy change does not
necessarily constitute a threat just because it imposes a more onerous condition than the
historical status quo. This example is more complex than the one in the text, however,
because it involves a government benefit package, not a pure threat or offer. See infra
Part IV.
83. See also Lyons, supra note 72, at 432 ("[T]he 'would-without-should' condi-
tion makes a proposal coercive even when the x which P offers is not expected by Q,
morally or predictively. Consider: 'The first I knew of Uncle Harry's plans to leave me
money was when he threatened to disinherit me if I married Alice.' ").
I therefore disagree with Westen's formulation of the coercion test in terms of what a
citizen would "expect." Westen, supra note 42, at 581. Even in the coercion (rather than
unconstitutional conditions) context, I think that a person with mistaken expectations
about what the proposer would do is not actually coerced; at worst, she feels coerced. But
I do agree with Westen that a proposer coerces if the proposer is mistaken in believing
that he will be making the recipient worse off than she otherwise would be. Id. at 581
(giving example of a newly conditional proposal to supply a certain amount of water, less
than the amount originally agreed, where proposer and recipient both mistakenly believe
that natural water supply will be low, but where actual natural supply will be higher
than the amount newly proposed). The latter problem is less likely to arise when the
proposer is the government, and when the situation that the recipient would "otherwise"
be in depends on what the government would do, not on what would naturally occur.
If the expectation test refers to "reasonable" rather than subjective or customary ex-
pectations, then it might be the same as the hypothetical predictive test. See, e.g., J.
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 228 (1986)(apparently treating the concepts as the same). But
that would only be so if the "reasonable" person should expect government to continue or
alter its benefit policies without regard to threats and offers. The test is then both dubi-
ous (don't reasonable people realize that governments sometimes make threats and of-
fers?) and gratuitous.
84. Notice that this problem is distinct from the question whether the recipient is
aware of the conditions on the government benefit when she first obtains it. This latter
question is relevant to whether the recipient has subjectively "waived" the right. For
example, does a person waive his right to complain about procedural conditions when he
agrees to takes a government job, and in that sense "take the bitter with the sweet"? See
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government actioa into a threat.
I think the hypothetical judgment or prediction baseline is appro-
priate if we are concerned about the legitimacy of government's ac-
tions, while the expectation baseline is more appropriate if we are
concerned about subjective pressure on the exercise of a right."5 But
I doubt that the problem of discrepancy frequently arises; and when
it does, the government should be entitled to escape from the more
stringent scrutiny attaching due to a recipient's misperception of a
threat simply by correcting the misperception. Thus, I will hence-
forth discuss only the hypothetical judgment baseline.
PART IV
APPLICATION TO GOVERNMENT BENEFIT PROGRAMS
Unconstitutional conditions issues rarely are of the pure form that
I have been discussing. Rarely does the government simply offer
money, or a tax break, in exchange for a person's agreeing to forego
exercise of a constitutional right (or for her agreeing to engage in
conduct, such as keeping silent or giving blood, that amounts to fore-
going exercise of a right). And rarely does the government simply
withdraw government benefits, or increase taxes, or similarly penal-
ize someone for exercising a right. 6 Although the threat/offer dis-
tinction is useful in the pure context, it remains to be seen whether it
is useful in the more complex context of government programs.
How do we generalize from a pure threat/offer issue to the more
complex issue of a condition on a government benefit package? Con-
sider Sherbert v. Verner. The government offers Mrs. Sherbert a
package: unemployment benefits, but with a condition that she be
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and
Stewart, J.). Only if he is aware of the "bitter" when he takes the "sweet." Of course,
this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of waiver. See text at notes 39-41.
85. Some philosophical discussions of coercion focus on the effect upon the co-
erced party, not the intent of the coercer nor the coercive mechanism he employs. See J.
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 247 (1986). And Wertheimer specifically identifies a "phe-
nomenological" nonmoral baseline, under which the victim/recipient's subjective point of
view determines whether the proposal is a threat or an offer. A. WERTHEIMER, supra note
42, at 207.
86. However, the issue is presented in fairly pure form in Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513 (1958), one of the early cases finding an unconstitutional condition. A provision
of the state constitution denied tax exemptions to persons who advocated the overthrow
of the government. This is a straightforward denial of a benefit that the person would
otherwise receive, because if the government were not permitted to impose the condition,
it undoubtedly would retain tax exemptions, which serve numerous other goals. See also
Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1355-57.
willing to accept employment every day of the week except Sunday.
How do we determine what she would "otherwise" receive, apart
from the condition? Is this a bribe to seek work from Monday
through Saturday? Or a threat to those who are not willing to accept
work from Monday through Saturday?
The hypothetical descriptive test asks whether the government
would still grant unemployment benefits if it were forbidden from
conditioning them on her seeking work every day of the week but
Sunday. The question is not what the government would do if it
could not impose any requirement that recipients seek work, for that
is not Mrs. Sherbert's objection. Presumably she would be content if
she were required to seek work six days of the week, but could
choose her day of rest.87 Rather, the question is what the govern-
ment would do if it were forbidden the option "seek work every day
but Sunday." If the government would still grant full unemployment
benefits, then she is being penalized for not seeking work. If it would
not grant the benefits, however, then the government is simply with-
drawing an offer. So the threat/offer characterization depends on
how important the condition is to the government's benefit program.
Another set of analogies underscores this conclusion. Suppose the
government had previously awarded unemployment benefits without
any requirement that recipients seek work on Saturday or Sunday.
Now distinguish two situations. In the first situation, (a), the govern-
ment requires efforts to obtain Saturday work, and slightly reduces
otherwise available benefits if recipients violate that condition. Alter-
natively, in the second situation, (b), it encourages such efforts, but
this time by increasing benefits slightly if recipients satisfy the con-
dition and seek Saturday work. Situation (a) is a threat, and situa-
tion (b) is an offer. When the government imposes an absolute eligi-
bility condition for benefits, the condition seems much more like
situation (a) than situation (b).
Under this analysis, many eligibility conditions on government
benefits will be threats. The only conditions that will be offers are
those that the government considers so important that it would
rather abolish the benefit program than drop the condition.88
87. A person who had religious reasons for worshipping and not working two days
per week would also have a constitutional objection, but the hypothetical test would ap-
ply to this objection slightly differently.
88. Consider Kreimer's discussion of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), in
which a campaign finance package provided the benefit of some government funding but
also imposed a condition, limiting campaign expenditures. Are the expenditure limits
threats or instead withdrawals of offers? Kreimer plausibly argues they are withdrawals
of offers. If the government could not limit expenditures, it would not want to provide
public financing; thus, "the denial of funds upon violation of the condition would leave
the recipients with no fewer choices than they would have had in the normal course of
events." Kreimer, supra note 1, at 1377. See also Seidman, supra note 3, at 78.
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I am not comfortable with this conclusion. Even if eligibility con-
ditions on government benefits are literally threats, they function
quite differently from pure threats. The condition Mrs. Sherbert
must satisfy, "seek work every day but Sunday," is at least some-
what related to the type of benefit she receives. In a pure threat
situation, by contrast, the nature of the government benefit is essen-
tially irrelevant; the benefit is simply something valuable that the
government can offer or withdraw in order to induce or discourage
some type of conduct. Imagine, for example, that persons who failed
to seek work on Saturday received a tax increase, or suffered a re-
duction in all otherwise available government benefits, of whatever
type. These conditions would be pure threats.
To put the point another way, in the case of a pure threat the
government should shoulder a heavy burden when it asks a recipient
to forfeit a right on pain of losing a benefit that she would otherwise
obtain, for she has not caused the relevant problem, and she receives
no reciprocal benefit. The government's action is prima facie ex-
ploitative.8 9 But when the forfeiting condition is relevant to the bene-
fit, and when the benefit is something the government has legitimate
reasons for defining and limiting in certain ways, then reciprocity
might exist. The recipient is not being "drafted" to perform a public
service; she is simply being asked to make reasonable sacrifices rele-
vant to what government is providing her.
Consider limitations on campaigning by public employees, as con-
ditions of employment. The Court has upheld such limitations.90
Should it have treated them as pure threats, akin to a direct criminal
prohibition of campaigning by government employees? I think not.
For the government is not simply using the threat of terminating
public employment as a convenient sword to encourage public em-
ployees not to campaign. Rather, the government believes that the
rule against political activity is a sensible condition relevant to suc-
cessful job performance. Indeed, even a pure offer to induce employ-
ees not to engage in political campaigning might be invalid. I doubt
89. In a similar vein, Sullivan argues: "government overreaches when it offers
benefits in order to gain leverage over constitutional rights. The state may have many
good reasons to deal out regulatory exemptions and subsidies, but gaining strategic power
over constitutional rights is not one of them." Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1493. However,
Sullivan's basic views differ significantly from mine: she rejects the threat/offer distinc-
tion as a guide to such government overreaching, id. at 1446-50, and she suggests two
further principles, in addition to "overreaching" into the private realm, that should prop-
erly guide unconstitutional conditions analysis. Id. at 1496-99.
90. See supra note 9.
that the government could offer its public employees a financial
bounty if they agreed not to campaign.
My tentative conclusion is that impure threats should receive a
lower degree of scrutiny than pure threats. I would roughly define an
"impure" threat as a condition to a government program (typically
an eligibility condition) that the government plausibly believes is rel-
evant to the legitimate purposes of that program. And lower scrutiny
is appropriate because the same factors that militate in favor of
higher scrutiny of pure threats militate in favor of lower scrutiny of
impure ones: a government benefit program may offer reciprocal
benefits, or its conditions may reflect real costs that the recipient
imposes. 9'
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission9 2 presents a version of this argument. In that
case, the Nollans wanted to replace their small cottage with a resi-
dence in keeping with the rest of the neighborhood. The Coastal
Commission would only permit this if the Nollans also granted a
public easement across the front of their beachfront property. The
Supreme Court held that the permit condition was a taking. Scalia
reasoned that if the Nollans were not seeking a permit to rebuild,
and the government simply required them to grant an easement, the
requirement would clearly be a taking.93 Does attaching the ease-
ment condition to the issuance of the permit make a difference? For
Justice Scalia, the answer depends on a version of the "greater in-
cludes the lesser" argument, which we could call the nexus test.
Under the nexus test, if the government could have refused the
permit for a public purpose, then it can impose a lesser restriction, a
permit condition - but only if that lesser restriction serves the same
purpose.94 The last proviso is very important. In Scalia's example,
91. Some philosophical writing also suggests that relevance is relevant in distin-
guishing threats from offers. For example, Wertheimer discusses "warning threats," by
which A induces B to act differently yet does not truly threaten because A is simply
informing B of a pre-existing plan. Warning threats are to be distinguished, however,
from "manipulative threats," by which A truly threatens B because A "elicits B's action
by developing a plan through which he can motivate B . . . ." A. WERTHEIMER, supra
note 42, at 220 (relying on concepts originally developed in Greenawalt, Criminal Coer-
cion and Freedom of Speech, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1081 (1984)). Wertheimer then adds
that "whereas the action demanded by [A in the first situation] is arguably germane to
the point of the threat, this is not so with respect to [A in the second situation]." Id.
Wertheimer's example of a "warning threat" is a moralistic informer who tells a drug-
user that he plans to inform the police. His example of a "manipulative threat" is a
greedy informer who tells the user that he will inform the police unless the user pays him
off. Id.
92. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
93. Id. at 831.
94. As Scalia reasoned, the government could ban the rebuilding entirely in order
to maintain visual access to the beach; therefore it could impose height limitations and
could prohibit fences to that same end. Id. at 836.
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although the government can forbid shouting fire in a crowded thea-
ter, it cannot make an exception from the requirement for those will-
ing to donate $100 to the state treasury. Similarly, "unless the per-
mit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the
development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of
land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion.' ,,95 Thus, the govern-
ment must show that the easement condition substantially advances
the legitimate government interests that would justify a complete
ban on rebuilding. 6
Scalia's nexus test is similar to my proposed criterion for distin-
guishing pure and impure threats. For Scalia also seems interested in
determining whether the government is honestly pursuing a legiti-
mate goal, or instead is simply putting pressure on a right.
9 7
I am not suggesting that whenever a condition is plausibly related
to the purposes of the benefit program, the condition passes constitu-
tional muster;98 rather, I believe that the degree of scrutiny should
be less. Still, having rationality signify even in this limited way
might prompt two different objections.9"
95. Id. at 837 (citing J.E.D. Assoc., Inc. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584, 432
A.2d 12, 14 (1981)).
96. The Court purported to apply the test, and concluded that the easement con-
dition did not substantially advance the asserted government interests. I have serious
doubts about the Court's application of the test, but that is not my focus here.
97. I do find several problems with the Nollan test, however. First, the nexus test
has both a "positive" and "negative" formulation, but the "negative" formulation is
much more problematic. The positive formulation is that government can regulate prop-
erty use with a condition if that condition serves the same purpose that a complete ban
on that property use would serve. The negative formulation is that if the condition does
not serve the same purpose, the regulation is automatically a taking. I might agree that a
regulation flunking this rational nexus test should warrant greater scrutiny, but I doubt
the wisdom of the blanket conclusion that all such regulations are takings.
Second, the "greater includes the lesser" positive nexus test probably cannot be gener-
alized beyond takings law. The test seems plausible in Nollan only because the greater
power to deny a development permit for visual access reasons often really does include
the lesser power to condition that permit and require a different property restriction (an
easement) if that restriction serves the same purpose. For the "lesser" here is a restric-
tion on another property right, not a restriction on a different constitutional right. And
citizens are more likely to consider property rights relatively "fungible." But this aspect
of the nexus test is relevant only in the takings context. By contrast, consider a govern-
ment's decision to require public speakers in a public park to pay for the privilege of
using it. Although the government could sell the park to the highest bidder for financial
reasons, it hardly follows that the government could ration access to the highest bidder
for financial reasons.
98. See Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 1131-33 (arguing that relevance is not
nearly enough to prevent a condition from being unconstitutional, citing Sherbert among
other examples); Lyons, supra note 72, at 431-32 (arguing that germane conditions can
nevertheless be coercive).
99. A contrary objection is that a rational condition should never be invalidated,
First, it seems strange to employ a test of rationality for the very
purpose of determining whether a court shall ultimately employ rela-
tively strict judicial scrutiny or instead a test of mere rationality."' 0
For example, the condition that welfare recipients must be residents
affects the right to travel, but it is a rational condition, and therefore
not subject to higher scrutiny. But if the welfare program conditions
benefits on a recipient agreeing never to travel outside the state, even
for a short period, the relevance to the purposes of a welfare pro-
gram is tenuous, and stricter scrutiny might apply. Yet this ap-
proach seems to put the cart before the horse. After all, judges usu-
ally consider the relevance of a restrictive condition to government
purposes at a later stage of constitutional analysis, when they are
trying to decide whether the condition satisfies or violates the rele-
vant level of scrutiny.
The explanation for this unusual methodology is that rationality is
legally relevant only for the limited purpose of identifying how the
condition functions - as a true penalty or as a plausible condition.
So the judgment of rationality itself is only a very limited one. The
court should simply ask whether the condition serves the pure func-
tion of inducing the recipient to act or refrain from acting in a cer-
tain way. In other words, would the withdrawal of any government
benefit serve that function just as well? If not, then the threat is an
impure one, and judicial scrutiny should be lower.'
This response helps answer the second objection to the "rational-
ity" test for the purity of the threat. Isn't "rationality" a notoriously
easy standard to satisfy?0 2 Especially if we concede that govern-
for such a condition amounts to the government redefining the baseline itself. The
threat/offer distinction would then be entirely useless. (I thank Bob Bone for pointing
out this argument.) But I reject this objection because it misunderstands the function of
the threat/offer baseline. The baseline is used simply to identify what kind of step the
government has taken when it makes a conditional proposal (as compared to where it
otherwise would have been standing). For example, if the government newly imposes a
work requirement as a condition of receipt of welfare benefits, such that a failure to work
results in forfeiture of some portion of those benefits, it is misleading to say that the
government has instantaneously redefined the baseline. For this characterization misses
the important question - whether and to what extent the new condition worsens the
beneficiary's situation from what it would have been if the condition could not have been
imposed.
100. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1457.
101. Rosenthal similarly distinguishes between "coercive conditions" that "regu-
late extraneous conduct" and those that are "expressions of the purpose of the expendi-
ture itself - the agreed quid pro quo of a contract for government employment. . . or
for the scholarly or other performance expected from the recipient of a grant." Rosen-
thal, supra note 11, at 1115. Only the former, he argues, deserve close judicial scrutiny. I
agree that government contracts might be distinguishable in this wdy, but I do not think
that identifying "the purpose of the expenditure itself' is otherwise an effective criterion
for deciding the proper level of scrutiny. (Rosenthal's medical school financial aid exam-
ple, id. at 1156, suggests problems with this criterion.)
102. See Seidman, supra note 3, at 76-78; Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality,
and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
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ment can serve ancillary goals through government benefit pro-
grams? Consider a policy of reducing general welfare benefits by
fifty dollars if the recipient refuses to remain silent for two days.
This, I want to say, is a pure threat. But why not say that it ration-
ally serves one of the ancillary purposes of the welfare program,
namely, encouraging the "silence" experiment?'
The answer, in short, is that welfare benefits as such are not a
peculiarly apt means of serving the goal; any other type of govern-
ment benefit would serve as well. So this is a pure, not an impure,
threat. Again, whether the policy is permissible is a separate ques-
tion. Although the policy is not really related to the distinctive func-
tions of a welfare program, it does serve other government purposes,
and it might or might not satisfy the applicable level of scrutiny. For
example, if the state has unsuccessfully tried other feasible options,
this unusual scheme might actually be necessary to achieve a com-
pelling government interest in understanding espionage.
Thus, the Sherbert Court was wrong to equate the loss of govern-
ment benefits for failure to seek Saturday work with a direct regula-
tion, and should have applied a lower level of judicial scrutiny. For
the condition is at least plausibly related to the purposes of the pro-
gram: requiring all persons to seek Saturday work avoids the cost
and difficulty of distinguishing religious from nonreligious "shirk-
ers," as well as the danger of fraudulent claims of religious
motivation.10
4
But now I am left with a final doubt.'0 5 If most complex govern-
ment benefit programs involve impure rather than pure threats, and
if impure threats are subject to lower scrutiny than pure threats, I
am not certain that impure threats are any more troublesome than
offers. In short, the threat/offer distinction might do no work at all
once we conclude that the condition plausibly serves the program's
distinctive purposes. Consider the hypothetical test as applied to a
complex program. Often the government has made the condition an
absolute condition to eligibility. Is there any remaining significance
to the counterfactual question whether the government would reen-
103. See Seidman, supra note 3, at 77-78 (hypothesizing that federal highway
funds are denied to states which permit women who have had abortions to use the high-
ways, then asking why encouraging childbirth should not be considered an ancillary pur-
pose of the highway program); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1474.
104. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407 (discussing danger of fraud); id. at 421
(Harlan, J., joined by White, J., dissenting) (discussing difficulty of distinguishing reli-
gious from nonreligious objectors).
105. I thank (?!) Larry Sager for instilling this doubt.
act the program without that condition? If it would not reenact, then
it considers the condition somewhat more important than if it would;
yet is that enough to justify a different level of scrutiny?
The hypothetical test seems persuasive in the pure context because
the government often will set a general level of welfare or tax bene-
fits for one set of reasons, and then use those benefits as carrots and
sticks for other, independent reasons. But what if the justifications
are interdependent? The test might be indeterminate. This problem
arises with many government benefit packages. And it is analogous
to the problem, discussed earlier,106 of selfish P who will rescue the
drowning Q only for a fee. Sometimes P really has independent rea-
sons for ordinarily rescuing or ordinarily not rescuing drowning per-
sons, regardless of whether he considered charging a fee. But per-
haps P has never independently considered the issue; he has always
charged a fee. Similarly, a government may never have considered
what it would do if it was not able to prohibit its employees from
campaigning, or if it could not condition campaign finance on expen-
diture limitations. 10 7 Even if we could imagine the answer, 08 how
much would it illuminate?
PART V
CONCLUSION
The distinction between threats and offers helps in fixing the
proper level of judicial scrutiny for conditions upon government ben-
efits that implicate constitutional rights. Government issues a pure
threat when it puts the recipient to the choice of foregoing exercise
of a right or else suffering a reduction in the level of government
benefits as compared to what the government would have offered if it
were not permitted to employ the objectionable condition. Govern-
ment issues a pure offer when it puts the recipient to the choice of
exercising a right, or else foregoing exercise and obtaining an in-
crease in government benefits as compared to what the government
otherwise would have offered. I conclude that a pure threat should
ordinarily be scrutinized just as strictly as a direct and unconditional
penalty upon the right. In this limited sense, the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions is valid. And a government's pure offer should
ordinarily receive lesser scrutiny. However, when a condition that
would otherwise appear to be a pure threat is germane to the pur-
106. See supra text at notes 73-77.
107. See supra note 88.
108. Severability clauses are only imperfect evidence of whether eligibility condi-
tions are threats or offers. The existence of such a clause indicates that the severable
condition is a threat, see Seidman, supra note 3, at 78, but the absence of such a clause
does not indicate that the condition is an offer.
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poses of a government program, I tentatively conclude that this im-
pure threat should receive lesser scrutiny than a pure threat; indeed,
it probably should receive scrutiny no greater than a pure offer. In
this limited sense, the "greater power includes the lesser."
The threat/offer distinction, though often clear, is occasionally
problematic. Specifically, the practical application of the hypotheti-
cal standard, "what the government would otherwise have provided
if it were not permitted to attach the objectionable condition," can
be awkward, and in some cases impossible. Moreover, even when the
distinction is coherent and practicable, it is not necessarily determi-
native of constitutionality. Sometimes both the threat and the corre-
sponding offer are constitutional; sometimes neither are; sometimes,
indeed, the threat is constitutional but the corresponding offer is
not." 9 The threat/offer distinction might only be one element in a
complete unconstitutional conditions analysis.
Nevertheless, in a number of cases, the threat/offer distinction
matters: threats are properly subject to higher scrutiny than offers,
usually the same level of scrutiny that would attach to direct, uncon-
ditional regulation. I hope this essay offers plausible arguments to
that effect, and does not threaten to increase confusion. But I wel-
come strict scrutiny of the arguments in either case.
109. See supra note 62 & text at note 68.

